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I. INTRODUCTION 
If any conclusions can be drawn from the very recent history of 
copyright case law and new media, among them is this: both courts and 
lawmakers view users of peer-to-peer network technology as nearly 
universally made up of copyright infringers. Such networks have evolved 
from those like Napster (which used a centralized index server through 
which users could share and search for files)1 to the software employed by 
Grokster (known as “Gnutella” technology), which allowed users to 
communicate searches and file-sharing directly between the users’ 
computers.2 Contrast this with Internet websites, specifically those that 
exist almost entirely for the purpose of encouraging, archiving, and 
displaying user-generated content. Their structures include clear and 
centralized servers; hierarchies of web managers and maintainers; and in 
the case of sites such as Facebook, Google, and YouTube, a multimillion 
dollar industry.3 All of these websites store and reproduce considerable 
amounts of copyrighted content, whether as the result of user submissions 
or their own practices. And yet unlike peer-to-peer networks, these sites 
have been affirmatively protected from copyright claims by the U.S. 
Congress through Section 512 (also known as the Safe Harbor provision) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).4 The response of 
lawmakers and courts to the way copyrighted material has been reproduced 
and distributed online has not hinged on the nature and structure of the 
technologies involved. Rather, online content providers have proved to be 
political forces to reckon with, as recently demonstrated in the recent 
controversy concerning the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) 
and the PROTECT IP Act (“PIPA”).5 SOPA and PIPA are largely 
                                                                                                                 
1. P2P, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
1055404/P2P (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
2. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921–22 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler & Scott Morrison, Facebook Shares Server Design, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274 
8704013604576248953972500040.html (Explanation of Facebook server design); see also 
David F. Carr, How Google Works, BASELINE, http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/ 
Infrastructure/How-Google-Works-1/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (Description of Google 
server architecture and market share); Jeff Simmermon, New Infographic: How Video Data 
Travels from a Phone to YouTube to a Laptop, TIME WARNER CABLE UNTANGLED (Sept. 14, 
2010, 9:47 AM), http://www.twcableuntangled.com/2010/09/new-infographic-how-video-
data-travels-from-a-phone-to-youtube-to-a-laptop/ (Infographic illustrates upload of content 
to YouTube servers); Google, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ 
business/companies/google_inc/index.html?scp=1&sq=google.com&st=cse (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2012) (Outlines market activity of Google and subsidiary YouTube).  
 4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
 5. See Sarah McBride and Lisa Richwine, Epic clash: Silicon Valley blindsides 
Hollywood on piracy, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/22/ 
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concerned with curtailing access to such sites rather than the issue of 
infringement liability6 and are particularly targeted toward sites based 
outside the United States.7 However, these laws raised concerns about the 
potential for false claims of infringement, the blocking of sites with 
substantially noninfringing content, and the possible burden on service 
providers and search indexes to block certain sites.8 The proposed laws, 
once considered very likely to pass, were met with such pushback from 
Internet services like Google and Wikipedia that their progress in the 
House and Senate were brought to a halt.9 User-generated content sites and 
Internet search indexes quickly managed to harness an enormous amount of 
political and social power10 that has not managed to save peer-to-peer file 
share networks, however.  
The tension between new technology and copyright ownership is not 
a recent development; it predates the advent of the Internet and other “new” 
technologies.11 But perhaps the first real test of copyright, new technology, 
and not only mass distribution but also mass reproduction, was the case of 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.12 The case of Sony 
and its Betamax video recording device initiated a doctrine of “substantial 
noninfringing use,” in a decision that ultimately favored the technology and 
arguably widened the scope of the fair use exception.13 The issue would be 
revisited with the introduction of peer-to-peer software, in which Sony 
would be revised and technology would come out the unambiguous loser, 
with the courts finding liability at an almost unprecedented scale.14 But 
                                                                                                                 
us-congress-piracy-idUSTRE80L0VS20120122.  
 6. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2011); Protect IP 
Act of 2011, S. 986, 112th Cong. § 6(b) (2011).  
 7. See generally Stop Online Piracy Act, supra note 6, at §§ 101–02.  
 8. Sopa and Pipa Anti-piracy Bills Controversy Explained, BBC, Jan. 17, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16596577.  
 9. See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against the 
Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/ technology/web-
protests-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-change-course.html?pagewanted =all.  
 10. See, e.g., id. (“Phone calls and e-mail messages poured in to Congressional offices 
against the Stop Online Piracy Act in the House and the Protect I.P. Act in the Senate. One 
by one, prominent backers of the bills dropped off.”); McBride & Richwine, supra note 5 
(“The massive online protest last Wednesday, in which Wikipedia and thousands of other 
websites closed down or otherwise protested and helped to kill controversial online piracy 
legislation, was widely heralded as an unprecedented case of a grassroots uprising 
overcoming backroom lobbying.”). 
 11. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 23–25 (2008) (discussion of 1906 
testimony before Congress of composers’ intellectual property rights and a then-new 
technology, the phonograph).  
 12. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
13.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 14. See generally MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005); A&M 
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even before the DMCA, websites hosting user-generated content enjoyed 
protections under case law not afforded to peer-to-peer networks, 
increasing the tension between the copyright owners that wished to protect 
their products and the practical considerations of user-generated content 
sites.15 Safe Harbor in the DMCA was a legal victory for technology, 
though not one without complication.  
The purpose of this Note is to use the history of vicarious liability 
claims to examine whether this is a prudent standard for assessing 
secondary copyright liability with regard to the distribution of content on 
the Internet. If the language of Section 512 does not amount to a loophole 
in immunity, this Note will explore whether a clear alternate standard could 
be developed that both addresses the concerns of Congress as manifested in 
the language of the Section 512 provisions, while also providing a level of 
immunity greater than that afforded by common law secondary liability. 
The current methods of addressing infringement on user-generated content 
sites available to copyright owners have arguably limited effectiveness,16 
as they place the burden of enforcement on copyright owners, who 
themselves must monitor and report infringement. With no real 
preventative options, copyright owners often have no means of stopping 
infringing material from being uploaded to the site once more.17 At the 
same time, practical considerations for the running of such sites limit the 
extent that a site can be held liable for its content. Forcing a site to monitor 
every submission may make that site generally unusable, and holding it 
liable if it does monitor submissions may simply dissuade such services 
from monitoring their submissions at all, leaving them open to hosting not 
only infringing material but also other undesirable content.18  
Some compromise, based on the financial benefit exception to Section 
512, may require a higher standard than typical secondary liability.19 The 
issue of Section 512 exceptions and the potential for a vicarious liability 
“loophole” has become an open question,20 with some commentators 
                                                                                                                 
Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (In both cases, the Supreme Court 
finds that Sony does not protect this Peer-to-Peer file-sharing technology). 
 15. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F.Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 16. See Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the US 
Copyright Act, in COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 182, 186 (Irini A. 
Stamatoudi ed., 2010).  
 17. Id. 
 18. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 19. Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 245 
(2009). 
 20. See, e.g., id.; Jason C. Breen, YouTube or YouLose: Can YouTube Survive a 
Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 151 (2007); Mike Scott, Safe 
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interpreting the DMCA as having raised the standard for actionable 
vicarious liability against Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), including 
user-generated content sites,21 as well as affording greater protection for 
copyright owners.22 However, this Note will emphasize that the 
determination concerning the Betamax VCR in Sony is a possible 
alternative standard. Though the Supreme Court has since moved away 
from Sony, such as in the case of peer-to-peer networks like Grokster, its 
example is an identifiable and sensible means of balancing the interests of 
copyright owners against those who manage Internet sites. 
This Note will focus on the history of secondary copyright liability, 
its application to new technology, and how it has been subsequently 
applied following the passage of the DMCA. Part II of this Note will deal 
with common law vicarious liability and how it has applied to new 
technology. This Part will begin with assessing how secondary liability 
and, in particular, vicarious liability has been applied to copyright 
infringement cases using the well-known case of Fonovisa v. Cherry 
Auction.23 Fonovisa applies the doctrine of vicarious liability to what may 
be considered a more “traditional” copyright infringement case—the 
production and sale of counterfeit copies of copyright-protected music 
records.24  
Part II of this Note will also outline the Sony case, a development in 
copyright case law that applied the standards of infringement to a 
technological possibility that had not previously existed25—the availability 
of recording and “time-shifting” programs, which would be the Supreme 
Court’s focus in developing the doctrine of “substantial noninfringing use” 
and the application of fair use to certain copying and viewing practices.26 
This Part will go on to assess the subsequent cases and technologies of 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.27 and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.,28 including their impact on both the Sony standard and on previous 
understandings of vicarious copyright liabilities and their illustration of the 
                                                                                                                 
Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99 
(2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Lee supra note 19, at 245. 
 22. See generally Adam Shatzkes, Note, The Destruction of an Empire: Will Viacom 
End YouTube's Reign?, 26 TOURO L. REV. 287 (2010). 
 23. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 24. Id. at 261. 
 25. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 442. 
 27. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 28. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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response to technologies that have not been found to be ISPs for the 
purposes of DMCA. 
Part III of this Note will analyze Section 512 of the DMCA and what 
it has meant for ISPs and user-generated content. This discussion will begin 
with an assessment of the treatment of ISPs, and, in particular, websites 
that hosted user-generated content prior to the passing of the DMCA, 
illustrating courts’ inclinations toward limited liability even before it was 
codified into law.29 It will review the language of the Section 512 Safe 
Harbor provisions and the similarity of this language to common law 
vicarious liability. Additionally, this Part will analyze courts’ mixed 
responses to Section 512’s comparisons to vicarious liability. While courts 
have both accepted30 and rejected31 this standard, they have consistently 
applied a higher standard of liability, even when using common law 
language.32 
Finally, Part IV of this Note will propose a return to the Sony standard 
in assessing vicarious liability issues concerning ISPs, particularly in the 
form of websites that host user-generated content. This Note will assert that 
the current system is inadequate to protect copyright owners from 
infringement, but that, at the same time, the practical realities of ISPs and 
user-generated content sites limit what can be done to prevent 
infringement. As a compromise, this Note will propose an interpretation of 
the Section 512 exceptions based on the Sony standard of substantial 
noninfringing use. This Note proposes that liability can only be claimed if 
the copyright owner can show that a web service provides no substantial 
noninfringing use, that it deals with no substantial exception in copyright 
infringement, and that it derives a direct financial benefit from the 
infringement.  
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND EARLY TECHNOLOGY: SONY’S 
ADOPTION AND DIMINISHMENT 
A.  Common Law Secondary Liability 
In its ruling in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals described the history of vicarious liability “as an 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
 30. See, e.g., Costar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001). 
 31. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To 
such a provider, the DMCA gives a safe harbor, even if otherwise he would be held as a 
contributory infringer under the general law.”). 
 32. See Lee, supra note 19, at 240. 
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outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior.”33 It described 
the inception of such liability as a means of “enforcing copyrights against a 
defendant” that had financially benefited from infringement but did not 
necessarily employ the infringer.34 The court found that Cherry Auction, a 
flea market that rented out space to various vendors, including vendors who 
sold counterfeit recordings, could be found vicariously liable for their 
vendors’ actions.35 The relationship between lessee vendors and the leasing 
owner was distinguished from a relationship akin to a landlord-tenant, on 
the grounds that Cherry Auction administrators retained the right to 
supervise and evict vendors, as well as to control customer access to the 
market area.36 The court found that Cherry Auction also met the 
requirement of reaping a financial benefit from their vendors’ actions, both 
in the low rent paid to them by the vendors but also in income received 
through parking, access, and concession fees that Cherry Auction charged 
its customers.37 The opinion describes pirated music as a “draw” for the 
market,38 suggesting that it contributes to the liability in that the money 
made from customers who came to the market for the purpose of buying 
counterfeit recordings is directly attributable to the original direct 
infringement. Cherry Auction had met the two prongs of vicarious liability: 
financial benefit and ability to monitor the infringer.39 Thus, the court 
created an aspect specific to vicarious copyright infringement: that such 
infringement can be found when a business’s appeal includes access to 
infringing work. 
B.  The Betamax Player and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court was faced with a case that applied the 
common law vicarious liability standard, applied in Fonovisa, to an entirely 
new medium and brand new technology: Sony’s Betamax video tape 
recorder.40 Sony set a precedent that would later be relied on unsuccessfully 
by defendants such as Napster and Grokster: the “substantial noninfringing 
use” standard. This standard41 concerned what the Court termed “time-
                                                                                                                 
 33. 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 34. Id. at 262. 
 35. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 263. 
 38. Id. 
39. Id. at 261–65.  
 40. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419 (1984). 
 41. The standard was conceived in a time that largely predated the widespread legal 
distribution of media through the sale of video cassettes as video rental stores were still 
developing, and the early video format wars were ongoing. See Jen Chaney, Parting Words 
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shifting”: the use of video recorders like the Betamax to record television 
programs so as to view them after their original airdate.42 
The implications of imposing liability on the manufacturers of a 
technology like the Betamax recorder, as opposed to its users, would have 
significant implications.43 As the Court noted: 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest 
on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of 
the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in 
the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a 
theory.44 
 The Court further concluded that in determining such secondary 
liability, the law must “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s 
legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”45 Thus, a technology capable 
of infringing use is not necessarily subject to secondary copyright liability 
simply because of this capability. “Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.”46 
As the Court noted in this case, there are limitations even to the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners over their works; the primary example 
is the notion of “fair use.” Fair use is an affirmative defense to a copyright 
infringement claim, analyzed using four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.47 
In this case, though the nature of the copyrighted work was fairly 
straightforward, and the amount of copying substantial, the Court 
emphasized that the “time-shifting” use of the Betamax recorder was not 
commercial in nature and asserted that it would not substantially affect the 
                                                                                                                 
for VHS Tapes, Soon to Be Gone With the Rewind, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/26/AR2005082600332. 
html.  
 42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. 
 43. See id. at 440 (Justice Stevens’s analogy to patent law).  
 44. Id. at 439. 
 45. Id. at 442.  
 46. Id. 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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market for the copyrighted programs.48 Though it is an affirmative defense, 
the Court determined that fair use was a “noninfringing use”: an act that 
does not violate the rights of copyright holders and does not constitute 
infringement.49 Without direct infringement, no vicarious liability can be 
claimed, thus absolving Sony and its product of the claims against it for the 
purpose of time-shifting.50 The act of copying copyrighted works thus 
constituted fair use, and any other uses for the Betamax recorder that did 
not fall under fair use or any other noninfringing activity were outweighed 
by the substantially legal ways in which the device could be used.51 With 
the development and widespread use of peer-to-peer networks, this 
reasoning came under significant scrutiny.  
C.  The New Technology: Napster and Grokster 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in the case of A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. was a resounding legal blow to the use of peer-to-peer 
network software, but it presents a clear case of how judges viewed such 
technologies as compared to how they viewed technology such as websites 
like Amazon.com and Google.52 To distinguish from both later instances of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing and Internet user-generated content, the nature of 
Napster’s file-sharing technology must be understood. In this case, there is 
one clear point of interest: Napster’s centralized server structure. 
Individuals who used the Napster program to share files did so by 
downloading its software, which enabled them to create personal file 
libraries. Creating an account with Napster would then allow them to 
upload their listed files from their computers to Napster’s servers.53 Users 
could then search these servers by file name and download other files from 
them. Essentially, the Napster software enabled users to list music files on 
their own computers and put them into a central Internet hub, which could 
then be accessed by anyone else with Napster software and an account.54 
Music files were only identifiable by the filenames given to them by the 
original users.55 Given the obvious potential use of such software, as well 
as the lines of communication Napster created and maintained for the 
purposes of illegally distributing copyrighted works, it is not surprising that 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–52. 
 49.  Id. at 455–56. 
 50. Id. at 442. 
 51. Id. at 418. 
 52. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 53. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 54. Id. at 1012. 
 55. Id. 
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Napster faced lawsuits from the recording industry.56 But portions of the 
Ninth Circuit’s methodology in discerning infringement warrants 
examination, particularly concerning the very different treatment 
lawmakers have afforded to websites. 
 Napster’s initial defenses drew from the primary sources concerning 
copyright and new technology: the DMCA and Sony.57 Its claim that peer-
to-peer networks qualified as ISPs under the DMCA’s Section 512 
provisions was questioned by the District Court, which refused to hold this 
as a matter of law.58 The Court of Appeals agreed,59 though it disagreed 
with the lower court’s reasoning on one particularly relevant point. The 
lower court held that the DMCA provisions did not protect parties from 
secondary liability, but the Court of Appeals refused to affirm this.60 
However, Napster’s attempt to seek immunity under Section 512 failed, 
with the court quoting the lower opinion: “[a]ny destruction of Napster, 
Inc. by a preliminary injunction is speculative compared to the statistical 
evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and uploading of 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works—as many as 10,000 files per second by 
defendant’s own admission.”61 
The impact of a file-sharing service such as Napster was clear; 
allowing it to continue would allow blatant, large-scale copyright 
infringement. Napster noted that its noninfringing uses included its users 
engaging in acts such as sampling, “space-shifting” (downloading music 
files they already owned), and the use of the technology by independent 
artists to permissively distribute their works.62  
The space-shifting argument, in particular, seems to echo Sony’s 
establishment of “time-shifting” as fair use in that its purpose is not to 
illegally obtain and keep a file without compensation to its creator, but to 
allow some convenience to the user without denying the creator the original 
payment. The court refused to apply Sony’s reasoning, however, holding 
that “time or space-shifting of copyrighted material [as in Sony] exposed 
the material only to the original user,” and did not involve the mass 
distribution of copyrighted material.63 Yet the opinion does note that under 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See, e.g., Napster Lawsuit Continues, BBC, Nov. 1, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/1000463.stm.  
 57. See id. at 1020, 1025. 
 58. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 2000 WL 573136 at *8 (N.D. Cal 2000). 
 59. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 926 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000)). 
 62. Id. at 1014. 
 63. Id. at 1019. 
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Sony at that point in time, the Napster technology could not be solely 
judged on its infringing uses but on its capability for use in noninfringing 
activities.64 
In addition to direct infringement, the Ninth Circuit also found that 
Napster could be held liable for secondary infringement, including 
vicarious infringement.65 The opinion addresses both requirements of 
vicarious liability, claiming that Napster meets both,66 though its points 
concerning the financial benefit prong in particular are arguably specious. 
In assessing financial benefit, the court relied on the “draw for customers” 
issue raised in Fonovisa.67 As with Fonovisa, the fact that counterfeit 
recordings could be obtained through Napster’s services was a primary 
means through which Napster added to its user base.68   
The fundamental difference between the cases was that Napster did 
not receive any payment associated with its services. Unlike Cherry 
Auction, Napster did not charge for access to its “vendors,” did not make 
sales to those who accessed its servers, and did not receive any sort of 
revenue from its vendors.69 The court points out that growth in its user base 
was beneficial for Napster, as it increased the quantity and quality of the 
files available in its servers. But its source of actual financial benefit is that 
“ample evidence supports the district court’s finding that Napster’s future 
revenue is directly dependent upon ‘increases in userbase [sic].’”70 In other 
words, the court found liability from a theoretical line of revenue that did 
not yet exist. Such an expansion of what may be considered a “financial 
benefit” certainly has significant implications for the nature of vicarious 
liability, particularly in relation to infringement through new media. 
The court’s analysis of Napster’s ability to supervise and control the 
nature of the content shared through its technology had particular 
implications for how later peer-to-peer systems would attempt to sidestep 
such liability. Napster’s centralized servers were clearly within their 
purview, and Napster had the power to terminate user accounts and block 
individuals from accessing its servers.71 The right to terminate user 
accounts was openly reserved by Napster, and the only leniency the court 
afforded in its analysis was in situations when Napster itself could not read 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 1020–21 (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 1020, 1024. 
 66. Id at 1022–24. 
 67. Id. at 1023. 
 68. Id. at 1022. 
 69. Id. at 1011. 
 70. Id. at 1023. 
 71. Id. 
460 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
the music files uploaded into its servers beyond the filenames.72 However, 
the evidence supported the assertion that protected material could be easily 
found among the user-assigned filenames and that Napster was capable of 
detecting and policing the inclusion of such material.73 Unlike websites and 
other ISPs, Napster could not simply wait until such infringement was 
called to their attention.74 
Following judgments against Napster, Grokster marketed its own 
form of peer-to-peer software, including depicting it as an alternative to 
Napster.75 Grokster’s software operated differently from Napster in that 
rather than having users share files by uploading them into a primary 
server, Grokster products allowed users to transfer files directly to each 
other, thus truly encompassing the concept of “peer-to-peer.” This 
decentralized structure meant that, in theory, Grokster, as purveyors of the 
technology, had no means of knowing or policing the files that were being 
shared with its product.76 While Napster’s software required a user to 
access a central server, meaning Napster could control such access and 
monitor the files available through this server, Grokster’s software worked 
entirely through communicating between computers without any such need 
of an intermediary server.77 Thus Grokster called into question the potential 
for any form of secondary liability attributable to the infringing actions of 
their users.  
The Ninth Circuit relied on Sony to find that Grokster could not face 
secondary liability, because the decentralized structure meant that the 
company was not aware of specific infringing activities.78 This is a level of 
awareness that the lower courts derived from Sony, which involved a 
technology that could have a substantial noninfringing use.79 Grokster 
products also notably did not receive revenue from users, but instead made 
money from streaming advertisements visible in their software.80 
Upon reviewing the case, the Supreme Court reversed the prior 
rulings by holding that the lower courts had misread Sony. Its reasoning 
and analysis focused heavily on Grokster’s business practices and 
advertising, specifically those which essentially characterized it as a new 
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Napster.81 In Sony, the Court held that a technology capable of a 
“substantial noninfringing use” could not face wholesale injunction without 
evidence of constructive knowledge of specific instances of infringement.82 
In other words, like a landlord and tenant, Sony could not be responsible 
for the actions of some users of its product if such a use did not reflect its 
intent for the product, the product’s necessary use (as in, it could have 
another), or Sony’s general knowledge about its use. Sony would simply be 
akin to the landlord renting a space to someone who happened to commit 
infringement. The Court in this case, however, looked to the evidence of 
Grokster’s specific stated desire to attract former Napster customers and 
maintain a library of popular copyrighted works flowing through its user 
base in order to attract customers83 and contrasted it with the position of 
Sony.84 Grokster was not an innocent, unknowing lease owner but 
specifically profited from the distribution of protected works. Essentially, 
the courts need not demand evidence of constructive knowledge in the face 
of obvious intent. Grokster had used a technology for the purpose of selling 
advertising space by drawing advertisement viewers with the promise of 
access to infringing content. 
While the cases of Sony and Grokster are distinguishable, the latter 
decision does raise serious questions about the continuing application of 
Sony. Of course, Betamax was a very different technology from software 
such as that used for peer-to-peer networks; Betamax’s overall copying 
capabilities were far less significant than that of software that can digitally 
copy and distribute content to an essentially infinite degree. Moreover, the 
mere fact that the Betamax was a piece of hardware, a physical technology, 
may set it apart in the view of judges and lawmakers. The Sony decision 
drew several analogies between copyright and patent liability,85 analogies 
that may seem clear with a physical device like a VCR but less obvious 
with a software program that has clearly fallen within the realm of 
copyright law.86 The implications of liability against a manufacturer may 
appear very different from those against the distributer of a computer 
program. However, the decisions in Napster and Grokster suggest that 
“merely” proving substantial noninfringing use is no longer enough for 
some new technologies to avoid liability. Meanwhile, a different form of 
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new technology, ISPs, has been afforded strong immunity from such 
claims.  
III. USER-GENERATED CONTENT, ISPS, AND THE DMCA 
A.  User-Generated Content Pre-DMCA 
Three years prior to the passage of the DMCA, the 1995 case of 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services 
addressed the issue of liability for copyright infringement as part of user-
generated content on an Internet bulletin board service (“BBS”).87 
Plaintiffs sued the operator of the BBS and the ISP, Netcom, which 
allowed access to the BBS for direct and secondary liability.88 The court 
distinguished the case from previous cases involving similar services by 
holding that ISP and BBS operators are not directly liable for a BBS user’s 
violation of a copyright owner’s reproduction right.89 The court also denied 
a finding for vicarious liability on the basis that the plaintiffs could not 
establish that either Netcom or the BBS had a direct financial benefit from 
the infringement. It did allow for a genuine question of contributory 
infringement, though this could be found only after the service’s failure to 
act after being notified of the infringing content.90 The court concluded on 
the issue of direct liability that when it came to user-generated content and 
the potential liability of ISPs and the operators of similar Internet forums, it 
could not “find workable a theory of infringement that would hold the 
entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.”91 
Also of interest is the court’s analysis on the defendant’s potential 
vicarious liability. The court did find a genuine issue in the copyright 
owners’ assertion that Netcom had the ability to police its subscribers 
through suspending the accounts of those who had posted obscene material 
and commercial advertising, in addition to the fact that the company could 
potentially delete specific posts.92 However, the court refused to consider 
the fees that Netcom charged its subscribers to be a “direct financial 
benefit” from the infringement,93 and dismissed the plaintiff’s contention 
that the operator of the BBS received a fee from users.94 The most 
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interesting argument on the financial benefit subject was the plaintiffs’ 
contention that unlike other ISPs of its time, such as AmericaOnline and 
CompuServe, Netcom advertised itself as “easy, regulation-free Internet 
access” for the purpose of attracting copyright infringers.95 Though the 
court rejected this theory, it is a clear reference to vicarious liability that 
“direct financial benefit” can be ascertained based on solicitation of 
infringement and presence of any sort of cash flow. As already discussed, 
the Ninth Circuit later held that vicarious liability could be found not only 
from the “direct financial benefit” reaped from solicitation for a fee-paying 
service (based on the theory that such solicitation depended on the service’s 
use for infringement), but also that such a benefit could exist even when 
such fees were just a future possibility.96 
The passage of the DMCA answered many of the questions 
concerning copyright infringement and the Internet that courts, as in 
Netcom, were grappling with or outright avoiding. Specifically, how does 
one discern copyright violations when the simple operations of transmitting 
data and computer caching could make “the entire Internet” liable? Could 
technologies harboring user-generated content be effectively dissuaded 
from policing their forums if doing so could result in their liability? The 
1996 Communications Decency Act had already partially insulated ISPs 
and websites from liability from nonfederal torts such as defamation.97 This 
allowed them the ability to police their content without concern for liability 
but expressly excluded intellectual property law from such immunity.98 
The DMCA’s Section 512 Safe Harbor and Notice-and-Takedown 
provisions thus did not afford protection to “innocent” service providers 
unaware of infringing content on their sites, but it also did not impose the 
burden of anticipating and policing content for infringement, as may have 
been the case under the Communications Decency Act.99 While a service 
would lose such protection if it had “constructive knowledge” of its use for 
the purpose of infringement,100 the simple fact that its technology could be 
used for such infringement is not enough to constitute such knowledge with 
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the notice-and-takedown system, which requires copyright holders to 
pursue infringing materials on protected sites.101 
B.  The DMCA’s Outline for Limited Liability 
The DMCA’s Section 512 limitations on liability relating to material 
online, or Safe Harbor provisions, encompass a wide range of potential 
ISPs and potential copyright infringing actions, which include affording a 
level of immunity to service providers that transmit material102 and general 
temporary storage of materials that takes place when a browser accesses 
and displays a website.103 The subsequent sections of Section 512 describe 
sites devoted to user-generated content like YouTube and indexing and 
search engines like Google.104 Their copyright immunity is described as: 
(c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of 
Users.— 
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary 
relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other 
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage 
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider . . . .105 
(d) Information Location Tools.—A service provider shall not be liable 
for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for 
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location 
containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using 
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, 
pointer, or hypertext link . . . .106 
 Each of these provisions is followed by a number of exceptions, 
including a process through which copyright owners may petition websites 
to remove infringing material. However, both sections include an 
exception, identically worded, which has been viewed by some 
commentators107 as a potential loophole in the law that could negate the 
benefits of Section 512 immunity. These provisions state that a service 
provider will not be held liable for monetary or injunctive relief if the 
service provider “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to 
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the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity . . . .”108 
The potential for a Section 512 loophole through this language is 
drawn from the fact that it strongly echoes the language of common law 
secondary copyright liability. While websites may be barred from liability 
in direct infringement, the language tying a party to potential infringement 
through financial gain, and a failure to control such activity when able, is 
strikingly similar to the language of common law vicarious liability. In 
Nimmer on Copyright, Melville Nimmer describes vicarious infringement 
as existing “when two elements are present. First, the defendant must 
possess the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct. Second, 
that defendant must have ‘an obvious and direct financial interest in the 
exploitation of copyrighted materials.’”109 Vicarious infringement does not 
require knowledge of the infringement110 but instead, like the DMCA 
exception, only requires a form of financial benefit and the “right and 
ability to supervise the infringing conduct.”111 Case law concerning this 
interpretation has been mixed and inconclusive,112 and the legislative 
history indicates that allowing for a vicarious liability claim against service 
providers was not the intent of Congress when drafting the statute.113 
However, the 1998 law was followed by holdings in Napster and Grokster 
in 2005 that, while certainly concerning technologies not covered under the 
DMCA limited liability provisions,114 also extended notions of vicarious 
liability, particularly in what may be considered “financial gain,” beyond 
what had been covered previously. In other words, peer-to-peer networks 
were held fully liable for the infringing actions of their users, whereas 
websites hosting even substantial amounts of infringing content have been 
largely protected.  
C.  What the DMCA Has Meant for ISPs 
How the Section 512 exceptions involving “a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing activity”115 should be applied, and 
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their potential connection to vicarious liability, is an unsettled issue in the 
courts. The DCMA itself has been described as “not a model of clarity,”116 
and, even with its guidance, the courts face the same dilemma which they 
did before. It is unclear how to balance the interests of copyright owners 
with the practical issues associated with Internet technologies, particularly 
those that allow or envision input from a large user base. In Costar Group 
v. Loopnet, Inc., the U.S. District Court of Maryland stated in dictum, 
“[b]asically, the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement 
because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability.”117 This is not a 
statement supported by the legislative history, which instead describes the 
exception as follows: 
In determining whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied, 
courts should take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not a 
formalistic one. In general, a service provider conducting a legitimate 
business would not be considered to receive a “financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the infringer 
makes the same kind of payment as noninfringing users of the 
provider’s service.118 
Aside from the point that a common sense, nonformalistic approach is 
unlikely to be used in a federal copyright case any time soon, the comment 
describes a noninfringer—that is, a “legitimate business”—but provides 
little help in describing what would constitute an actual infringer. Does 
“legitimate business” mean that the presence of infringement in the user-
generated content on a site should be incidental to that which is legal? Is 
there some percentage of content at which a site stops being legitimate and 
its financial benefit becomes directly attributable to the infringing activity? 
Can a site avoid liability by not promoting itself as a prime location for 
obtaining infringing materials, as the Supreme Court so emphasized in 
Grokster? Can the liability be found for a site simply being used for 
infringement, even if not clearly advertised, as in Napster and Fonovisa?  
The record also indicates that “a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic 
payments for service” could not constitute a direct financial benefit.119 
Perhaps this is in contrast to the swap meet entrance fee of Fonovisa, 
though not the streaming advertisements that funded Grokster. It seems 
clear that regardless of the record, some protection for copyright owners 
was intended in these exceptions, particularly under conditions that have 
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typically been associated with vicarious liability. But how, as a practical 
matter, should that protection be applied? 
Despite Costar’s in dictum comments, Nimmer’s treatise makes the 
case that the standard used in Costar was one higher than common law 
secondary liability.120 He observed that the courts have applied a standard 
in which the financial benefit must be directly attributable to the 
infringement, though previous cases (such as Cherry Auction and Napster) 
had found vicarious liability through what was essentially indirect 
attribution to any financial benefit.121 The Ninth Circuit case of Ellison v. 
Robertson similarly required a “causal relationship between the infringing 
activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps,” regardless of how 
substantial the potential benefit was to an Internet service or content 
provider.122 Though the Ninth Circuit would later conclude that the 
similarity of the exception’s language to common law vicarious liability 
means it should be read as such,123 it also continued Ellison’s approach of 
applying a standard requiring a causal relationship between the infringing 
activity and the financial benefit, and additionally applying a relatively 
high standard of proof that such a relationship existed.124 Despite 
repeatedly tying the language of Section 512 exceptions to that of vicarious 
liability, the courts have, with some consistency, applied a higher standard 
than that traditionally used for such liability, or else have failed to apply 
traditional liability with the reasoning that Section 512 forbids it.125 
The most prominent, current test case for exceptions to limited 
liability may be that of Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., a case 
involving two colossal entities with corporate copyright ownership on one 
side, and one of the most popular Internet forums for user-generated 
content on the other.126 In its complaint against YouTube, Viacom 
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specifically asserts that the website falls under the “financial benefit” 
exception, claiming that through advertising the site “has built an 
infringement-driven business by exploiting the popularity of Plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works (and the works of other copyright owners) to draw 
millions of users to its website.”127  
While the complaint concedes that “YouTube’s website purports to be 
a forum for users to share their own original ‘user generated’ video 
content,” it still contends that a “vast” amount of that content is in fact 
copyright-protected work, that YouTube “induces” this content, and that it 
even uses the presence of such content in negotiating license agreements 
with copyright holders.128 Effectively, Viacom argues that YouTube is not 
the legitimate business that Congress envisioned in drafting Section 512, 
but rather is a technology used for massive infringement with a substantial 
financial interest in this infringing use.129 The case was filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in 2007,130 with both 
Viacom and YouTube moving for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether YouTube qualified for Section 512 protections.131  
 In 2010, the trial court ruled for YouTube, finding that it was 
protected by Section 512 and rejecting Viacom’s arguments that YouTube 
fell under Section 512’s exceptions.132 Judge Louis Stanton emphasized the 
necessity of the defendant to have the “right and ability to control” the 
infringing content, noting in particular that “the provider must know of the 
particular case before he can control it,”133 and thus finding the notice-and-
takedown process to be sufficient. Judge Stanton also explicitly rejected 
any comparison to Grokster:  
The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider who 
furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of materials . 
. . while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to 
receive complaints of infringement, and removes identified material when he 
learns it infringes.134 
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The court also clearly distinguished the Section 512 exceptions from 
secondary liability under the common law, finding that “the DMCA gives a 
safe harbor, even if otherwise he would be held as a contributory infringer 
under the general law.”135 Viacom will appeal the ruling.136 
Peer-to-peer networks and sites that host user-generated content are 
mechanically very different examples of Internet technologies and new 
media. The former involves software programs a user installs (rather than 
accesses remotely) and uses to share files directly with other users.137 The 
latter can be a host of different websites, from those that are effectively the 
web version of classified ads, such as Craigslist.com or the comment pages 
of news stories, or a site like YouTube, which is capable of hosting legal 
content as well as infringing files.138 In cases such as Napster and 
Grokster, it was not a difficult matter to target the technology itself, as the 
Supreme Court chose not to do in Sony. But the more substantial questions 
are whether the practical differences for copyright claims and infringement 
are great enough as to warrant the very different ways in which their 
respective mediums are treated, and whether anything can be learned from 
the effect the law has on the sharing of protected media. 
IV. REVIVING THE SONY STANDARD FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY 
A.  The Need for a Standard in Understanding Section 512 
Exceptions 
While legal and practical changes could be made to the practice of 
copyright law, the process by which copyright owners may assert their 
rights to their works in the context of user-generated content on the Internet 
may often be ineffective and unsubstantial,139 or may be used for improper 
purposes (when the purpose is to silence a critic rather than make a valid 
copyright claim, a takedown notice may be much easier to produce than an 
infringement complaint).140 This hurdle has been mitigated somewhat by 
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sites like YouTube actively making licensing agreements with copyright 
owners.141 However, the exceptions in Section 512, rather than being 
essentially meaningless or amounting to a loophole in liability, can give 
rise to some middle ground between copyright owners and Internet 
distributors, as well as the Internet users who are ultimately the direct 
infringers. 
Though perhaps abandoned in the wake of Grokster, the reasoning of 
Sony is a good starting point. The Sony case involved a new technology 
where it was unlikely that anyone wanted to see it stifled entirely. 
Universal had sought an injunction against the “manufacture and 
marketing” of the Betamax VTRs but also “money damages and an 
equitable accounting of profits.”142 A means by which Universal could 
obtain royalties through the use of the Betamax would likely have been the 
most ideal outcome of the case for Universal, though the Supreme Court’s 
decision did not offer them the leverage to negotiate this with Sony. 
Despite this, it is certainly the case that copyright owners were later able to 
work the new technology into their own marketing. VTRs and VCRs could 
play legally distributed video tapes as well as the “time-shifting” created 
ones that had so irked Universal. The unease of Justice Stevens in ordering 
an injunction concerning the technology is expressed in his prediction that 
ruling for Universal “would enlarge the scope of respondents’ statutory 
monopolies to encompass control over an article of commerce that is not 
the subject of copyright protection.”143 To some extent, copyrighted works 
and the media through which they can be distributed must have some line 
drawn between them, and the line the Court draws is that of the 
technology’s capability for noninfringing use. 
Despite this language separating a technology from its possible use in 
aiding infringement, the Court in Grokster revised its position on Sony. 
However, this was primarily because Grokster was open about its 
intentions as a space for sharing protected works, even if the program itself 
would be capable of a noninfringing use. While the fact that peer-to-peer 
file sharers failed to qualify as an ISP for the purpose of the DMCA is more 
or less settled,144 the principal difference between Grokster and a piece of 
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technology like the Betamax player, which could also directly be used for 
the purpose of infringement and a peer-to-peer network, is the simple fact 
that those who maintained such networks were not only aware of those who 
used them for the purpose of infringement but also actively encouraged this 
behavior.  
The “draw” of Grokster and Napster was ultimately their potential for 
illegal distribution of copyrighted works.145 Even the practices Napster put 
forth as consistent with fair use were rejected.146 But limiting these 
technologies also meant limiting their potential for future legal use. Unlike 
Betamax, and later the protected-status sites such as YouTube, copyright 
owners have largely sought to shut down peer-to-peer systems rather than 
analyzing whether they could be a beneficial medium through which to 
distribute their works.147 
Typical user-generated content sites may lie somewhere between the 
justifications found in the Sony and Grokster decisions. Such sites involve 
content that could be substantially made up of copyrighted works. As with 
peer-to-peer networks, these sites can generally limit or prevent a user from 
accessing or uploading content on a site.148 Many such sites also take in 
most of their revenue from the use of streaming advertisements on their 
sites, thus encouraging sites to attract as many viewers as possible.149 For 
instance, Viacom has counted the number of times its protected content has 
been viewed on YouTube at over one billion,150 suggesting that the 
accessibility of copyrighted material is part of the site’s “draw.” But the 
site plainly has noninfringing uses, between the submission of original 
videos by users and the licensing agreements the site can form with 
copyright owners to allow their work to be distributed via the site. Setting 
aside the DMCA provisions, if user-generated content websites were 
judged by the same standards that networks like Grokster and Napster 
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faced, they also would likely be liable for vicarious infringement.151 As it 
is, with a DMCA provision echoing vicarious liability, the question as to 
how it should be applied to websites, and what can be taken from the law’s 
approach to other user submission-based forms of new media is left open. 
B.  Betamax and the World Wide Web: How Sony Could Form a 
Compromise in Liability 
As discussed, case law following the passage of the DMCA has left 
the secondary liability issue unsettled. Despite legislative history to the 
contrary, courts seem inclined to apply the Section 512 exceptions as a 
rough equivalent to common law secondary liability. On the other hand, 
courts also seem disinclined to go as far as the liability standard established 
for peer-to-peer clients such as Napster and Grokster. Even with existing 
case law, there is no obvious middle ground from the language of the 
statute. Attempts to move away from the language of the common law still 
do not address how the exceptions should be implemented in dealing with 
the issue of infringement hosted by ISPs. While it is true that applying 
liability to a much greater extent may be impractical, the Court’s Sony rule, 
even narrowed in light of Grokster, provides a potential standard that could 
be a compromise between the needs on both sides. 
As was the case in Sony, the Internet (specifically, user-generated 
sites) presents a threat of substantial noninfringing uses. The legislative 
history of the DMCA appeared to indicate as much in its reference to 
“legitimate businesses” as ISPs.152 Though capable of infringing use, the 
technology of the Internet has overwhelming capabilities for noninfringing 
activities. The standard should apply more specifically to individual sites as 
individual technologies—with the application of different coding and 
programming platforms, they often are essentially different forms of 
technology. Thus, the issue would be whether the purpose and use of the 
site is substantially noninfringing.  
In many ways, this is already the question facing YouTube. While the 
technology of the site itself, in allowing users to load video clips for public 
viewing, has a clear noninfringing use, the question may become whether 
such use is substantial, or whether YouTube’s business is substantially 
rooted in infringing content. In Fonovisa, secondary liability was grounded 
in Cherry Auction’s benefit from the substantial amount of music piracy 
that occurred in the physical stalls it rented to vendors.153 Its customers’ 
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awareness of the counterfeit records sold there was considered a major 
draw of the market, in turn producing various ticket and concession sales 
and fees to the market itself.154 In contrast, the case of Sony involved a 
market in which the maintainer of the technology was very remote from its 
user, and its possible infringing use was only one aspect of a technology 
that could facilitate considerable noninfringing activities. There, the court 
concluded that there was no liability.155 
In some ways, an Internet site seems more akin to Cherry Auction: it 
has substantially more power over and awareness of those who access the 
site than Sony had of those who bought the Betamax. Sites hosting user-
generated content are often essentially virtual marketplaces, with customers 
paying their way by viewing advertisements while consuming the posted 
content. The logical follow up would be to consider whether the definite 
presence of copyrighted material among this content is enough to consider 
what revenue a site receives from its users as a trigger for the exceptions 
under Section 512. Under traditional common law, the answer may be yes, 
which would shift the burden of preventing and policing infringement to 
the site maintainers to a point that may be simply impractical. Public policy 
could lead to the conclusion that some measure of policing should be 
possible without making site maintainers subject to liability.  
Inevitably, assessing issues of copyright protections and Internet 
business is likely going to come down to a balancing test—pitting the 
interests of copyright owners against both the interests of online businesses 
and the practical realities and implications of new technologies. The Sony 
case, decided in a situation where previous applications of copyright policy 
could have proven impractical, provided the doctrine of substantial 
noninfringing use.156 The balance is adjusted somewhat toward benefiting 
new technology, but not so far as to leave copyright owners with no 
recourse. A test that examines the extent to which a site engages in, exists 
for the purpose of, and provides its technology to benefit financially from 
an infringing use would work as a practical alternative for dealing with 
user-generated content sites. It would give protection to sites that genuinely 
exist for the purpose of maintaining substantially noninfringing content, 
and it would protect copyright owners who are otherwise perpetually 
engaging in the Notice-and-Takedown System of sites that substantially use 
the property of others.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Legal approaches to new media, such as peer-to-peer networks and 
Internet forums of user-generated content, have been largely inconsistent. 
The passage of the DMCA in 1998 did not entirely address the dilemma 
facing courts, copyright owners, and website operators and maintainers: 
balancing the practical realities of the Internet against the rights of 
copyright owners. Legislation and case law have reflected the general 
sentiment that peer-to-peer networks like Napster and Grokster were 
primarily the domain of infringers encouraged by those who produced their 
software. This resulted in lawsuits that stretched the applications of direct 
and secondary (particularly vicarious) copyright liability. Websites that 
host user-generated content have received some immunity from liability in 
the form of Section 512 of the DMCA, but with notable exceptions, 
including those that strongly echo the language of vicarious liability. With 
the case law concerning these exceptions and their impact on Section 512 
immunity still unsettled, the most practical way to view the exceptions 
would be to assess them through a lens that deals honestly with the 
continuing issues of large scale Internet infringement but also addresses the 
complications of pursuing copyright ownership online.   
The DMCA liability exceptions evoke the two prongs of vicarious 
liability—financial benefit and ability to control the infringing activity. 
Though courts have consistently applied (if not stated) a higher bar for 
websites in what may constitute financial benefit, they have also noted the 
suggestions of vicarious liability in the statute, even though this is against 
its legislative history. Even prior to the passage of the DMCA, courts were 
hesitant in applying direct and secondary liability to ISPs and site managers 
for infringements committed by users. But it is also true that the differences 
between user-generated content sites and peer-to-peer networks are narrow. 
They both derive revenue from advertising and subscriptions, and they both 
rely on the content of their users in order to operate. While the Supreme 
Court had clear evidence of Grokster’s desire to acquire copyright 
protected works in order to maintain its user base,157 it could certainly be 
argued that YouTube similarly benefits from those who post and view 
copyrighted material on its site. Though the courts have interpreted the 
Section 512 exceptions to indicate that the financial benefit a site or 
business receives must be “directly attributable to the infringement”—
meaning the lines drawn between the specific infringement and a financial 
benefit are clear—this may simply not be workable for copyright owners, 
even in the face of flagrant, widespread infringement. The more practical 
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solution, though rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison,158 may be to 
instead assess how substantially a site’s income is the result of its 
technology being used for a “legitimate business” purpose or is simply the 
product of the attraction of infringing works. Or, to reprise the standard of 
Sony, the primary inquiry should be whether the nature of the forum for 
user-generated content is one with a substantially noninfringing purpose. 
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